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Q: I had asked you about the assertion that, not that you disagreed with that point of view as expressed by Rodriguez and those others, but at how the facts were at odds with the truth, I believe. How so?

A: There's nothing new, if you read what the proponents of enhanced interrogation techniques are saying, there's nothing new. It's the same story, being repeated again and again.

Q: Nothing 'new,' I'm sorry, you said...

A: There's nothing new, nothing new whatsoever. Not with Mr. Rodriguez, not before him with some other people who also wrote books and had allegedly access to one side of the story. People who are talking about these kind of things, really, were never there, never saw what's happening, never saw what's going on. And I like to talk only about the Abu Zubaydah situation because... for two reasons: number one is Abu Zubaydah's case has been used as the case study of success. Number two, it was a case that I was involved in, before I got PNG'ed (made persona non grata, ie expelled) from the program. So that's why I don't talk about what happened with KSM or what happened... you know, I let the facts talk about themselves with all the declassified documents from the CIA, from the FBI, from DoJ, from the military. The facts are there. But I talk about Abu Zubaydah because I was there. And there were claims that the identity of KSM came because of waterboarding. There is another claim that we stopped Padilla from detonating a dirty bomb in the Washington, DC area also because of waterboarding. That claim was said by the president in '06 and it was also mentioned in the declassified DoJ memos from the OLC. If you look, for example, at the memo of Bradbury, he was very clear that he believed in the efficacy of the program based on the efficacy memo that he received from the CIA that said these things that I mentioned. Well, there's a problem with the facts here, you can't not just in '05 make an efficacy memo that rewrites history. Number one, Padilla was arrested in May 2002. Waterboarding did not until August of 2002. Well, it started kind of unofficially based on verbal approval on July 25, but, you know, it didn't start until August.

Q: Some of the other things that would be in the enhanced interrogation technique regime were informally in place before that.

A: Well, we can't discuss that.

Q: Ok.

A: They didn't say the others, they said waterboarding. They told us waterboarding gave the information. Now, after all these facts changed, they start changing their story. And I talk about a lot of the details into this in my book. A lot it has been redacted. I was there, I know what worked and what didn't work. So that's not what they said, they said waterboarding. So let's go with waterboarding here.

The other element is KSM. We identified KSM as a mastermind before even the CTC (counter-terrorism center personnel) arrived. Now, there were videotapes, and in these videotapes you can see us also on the videotapes. You can see, after watching, what worked and what didn't work. People can make their own mind. Unfortunately the tapes were destroyed.

Q: Ok, you're talking about *those* tapes.

A: Yeah, we're talking about *those* tapes. Unfortunately the tapes were... and now we can actually go into the different claims. They claimed that the tapes were destroyed, Mr. Rodriguez claimed because he wanted to protect his people. Well, that's not what they said. He said, in the declassified emails that the CIA declassified themselves, what he said was that it will make us look terrible. So the issue of protecting the people wasn't mentioned in any of the documents or the declassified emails. That's number one. Number two...

Q: And they could have been... fixed up the tapes so as to conceal the identities.

A: Well, first of all the tapes, the only people you can see without faces –without covers, are the good interrogators. All the other ones were wearing masks, so that doesn't make any sense.

Q: So, theoretically, you would only have their voices.

A: You only have the voices, theoretically.

Q: Ok, that's another point.

AS: With a ski mask, so that's basically two different things.

Q: And we know that because...

A: I was there.

Q: It was in the tapes. So there were no separate interrogations of them alone, without you, in these tapes.

A: I'm talking about Abu Zubaydah. So were the tapes. I don't want to talk about other things, I wasn't there with other things. I talking about the case study, the show case of the success of EITs and what they said about it, and how their stories have been... our version of the story, the people who are against EITs, if you want to call it, our version of the story didn't change, from day one until today. Their version has been changing. Now, I think they reached the point, because of the overwhelming evidence from even the CIA itself, or the IG said not one single –he couldn't prove one single imminent plot stopped because of EITs, this is in the CIA IG. Now they're changing, they're saying well, it was good cop versus bad cop. Well, the people who are coming with these conclusions, first of all they are not cops.

Second, they have no idea what's good cop versus bad cop. Third, they were not there and they never interrogated a person in their life, they are political hacks. They worked for different politicians in Washington and they were repeating what the political message is. (presumably a reference to mukasey, et al.)

Q: Now they have a stake, a reputational stake in this. Their reputation is tied to the policies they made.

A: Absolutely. We don't have any stake, we're not running for office, we don't want to be part of any administration, that's not what we're looking for. We're doing this for the sake of history and for basically, hopefully, for future generations and future administrations, to look into all these elements of every case before they make a decision that might be a stupid decision and create more damage than... that's the main reason that...

Q: You're anticipating my next question. Why are you so...

A: So, and that's something—a lot of people said, you know, why I'm talking publicly now, why I didn't talk—none of that's—that's why I was basically kicked out of the program.

Q: I don't have that question any more.

A: Because I talked.

Q: He was kicked out of the CIA program.

A: Yeah, what became the EIT program, you know, after Abu Zubaydah. It's on the record by the FBI investigation that has been declassified and by the DoJ that I reported this all the way to the director's office. The FBI did not get involved because of the descriptions of what happened. Later the FBI pulled out all their people. And after that, when you report something like this, this is not something that people are going to take it easy on you, so there were a lot of investigations behind closed doors, to include the 9/11 Commission. I talked about everything that I talk now. I probably have better stories then, because it was still fresh in my mind. And with the tapes, as you now know, yes they were destroyed, but all my notes are still here. We talked about note-taking, and my notes are in the hands of the government.

Q: In Bureau files.

A: Bureau files and I'm sure that the Senators that you mentioned(have it).

Q: I was going to ask, do they have access?

A: Yeah, they read the notes. Plus, all the data reports, suddenly after they disappeared for a few years, they appeared all of a sudden, the data reports that we used to send, that basically when you read

them, you figure out that there's nothing called good cop and bad cop. There was a technique that was not working whatsoever, they bring us when they haven't worked, then they claim that the technique worked, but that's not what happened, and all these things are in the... you know, and the reports—

Q: This is the DA information?

A: No, this is still Abu Zubaydah.

Q: No, I'm sorry, the information that led to—

A: Padilla, and you know, it's not only Padilla, it's basically everything. Everything that we know about Abu Zubaydah came from when we arrested him until May. Now after 83 sessions of waterboarding, he admitted he's the number three guy in al-Qaeda, which is not true. He admitted to a lot of things that aren't true, but he wasn't even an al-Qaeda member. So you can take everything that he said, either he repeated it because, I don't know, or he claimed without him being repeating it that this is what happened.

Q: Now they claimed that he provided information that led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, do you know what they were talking about there?

A: Well, he gave us a lot of information based on phone numbers that we had, based on pocket litter, so these kinds of things led to some elements of that, but the majority of the information came from another detainee who was arrested in Bagram and was interviewed by an FBI agent.

Q: This is Darbi?

A: I don't know if the information is our or not, so...

Q: Ahmed al-Darbi, the one who was beating his mistress...

A: I don't... the story of Darbi is in my book, but the other information... because they confuse me with the book, with all the redactions that they did, so I have to be very careful.

Q: And the redactions were all very sensible, of course.

A: Yeah, especially the pronouns. But if it's in the book, that means it's approved by the FBI, and we want to battle with the agency for it, but otherwise, it's... so excuse me if I'm confused with what they redacted and what they didn't redact. And actually, the FBI agent was a new agent that interrogated that specific subject, and he got the director's award for it, for that interrogation because it led to that. So it's a combination of information, you know, it's not a Hollywood type, it's not like one single thing...

Q: Yeah, every time I look into a specific thing, it's a combination...

A: There is nothing once, even the whole story with Padilla, it wasn't like he said oh, there's a guy, his name is Padilla, he wants to –it wasn't like this. He didn't even know his real name, it was a lot of other things that led us to put the case together with a very smart CIA operational guy who read the information, he said well, that makes sense, his description matches the description of these guys, and we put it together and we figured out that this is the person.

Q: Were you and your partner in the room when he revealed that information?

A: Yeah, we were there.

Q: Ok, because Marc Thiessen has claimed that...

Q: Marc Thiessen is a very important investigator in operative—

A: I got it, I mean, come on, seriously? So has Dick Cheney claimed, and Addington claimed, and everybody claimed... I mean, we're talking about facts and politics here.

Q: also, you make a pretty good case about them fiddling with dates.

A: Well, that's not –I'm pointing out, I'm not making any claims on that, I'm pointing out.

Q: Ok, I'd make quite the case, but pointing out the dates –

A: I'm point out, and that is not only my claim. If you look at the DoJ OPR investigation, they mention a lot of dealing with the efficacy section has been redacted, but there's some stuff that's not redacted. Like, for example, the efficacy memo of the CIA to DoJ claims that Padilla was arrested in May of '03, because May of '02 doesn't match the claims of that they were saying, so they said May of '03, then it makes sense. Bradbury in the –

Q: CIA to DoJ.

A: DoJ, to the OLC. They said Padilla was arrested in May of '03. Padilla, as you know, was arrested in May of '02, not May of '03. But it doesn't make sense to say May of '02 when EITs did not start until...

Q: And you don't believe that's just a typo, you believe that's sort of contrived. It appears to be contrived...

A: Well, you make up your own mind, I'll tell you the facts and you make up your own mind. If you're doing something for history, I don't want to put my own personal opinion. I stay with the fact as an FBI agent, that's what I trained to do, I survived many days on stands in federal and military courts because I don't say my opinions, I put the facts. He said it's May of '03 in the efficacy memo. Bradbury –now the efficacy memos are still classified. However, we now know some of the claims they did in the efficacy

memo because of the different declassified documents to include the OPR report, the OPR DoJ. Now, they asked him, the investigators, why do you say, make the claim of May of '03 when Padilla was actually picked up in May of '02?

Q: I'm sorry, the first part of that sentence is... we asked, can you do that again, please?

A: I said the investigators, the OPR people, they asked Bradbury, how do you claim –because he based this whole idea on the efficacy memo. His reasoning to reinstate EITs was based on the efficacy, so if you want to talk about efficacy, I think this is a very important memo to read, and to see the OPR investigation of that memo, ok? In his memo, he said you told us that Padilla, because of waterboarding, Padilla was picked up before detonating a bomb, whatever, in May of '03, ok? In May of '03. But they said that Padilla was picked up in May of '02, May is way before August 1, 2002, so how do you make that claim, if you claim it on the efficacy? He said my job is not to investigate the facts. So, another thing with –there's another CIA document, and I have a copy of it, it has been declassified, it claimed that bin al-Shibh, for example, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was arrested also in December, December of 2002. Well, I was there, I picked him up.

Q: You got called away for that.

A: Yeah, I picked him up from Karachi. It was September 11 –

Q: You were actually in the raid?

A: No, I wasn't in the raid, I picked him up from the raid. Don Borelli, who's sitting next to me here, behind this wall, he was in the raid, he was one of the people who led the raid. We went in the same... we both GTTF, but I flew from here to Karachi, picked him up, we took him to the first undisclosed location, then we took him to another –they took him then to another undisclosed location.

Q: We know from, I mean...

A: Undisclosed locations. So basically, you can hear it from –I'm sure, probably, it is written somewhere, but I cannot say it, because of classification issues, you understand. So they claimed it's December, well actually it's September. Why? You don't know how the efficacy memo, the timelines –so everything that has been claimed, there are dates that have been altered. And I don't think in important documents, you'd be so, kind of like...

Q: Of course, right... approximate.

A: Right. In this type, it actually makes perfect sense for so many people, I mean if you want to –

Q: Bin al-Shibh's arrest was September 11, it's an easy date to remember.

A: Granted, it's an easy date to remember. And I can get you the document. It is already –I read a lot of the declassified documents because I think it's interesting for me, and just to know what I didn't know at the time. And when you see how dates are being altered, you think ok, no wonder there's a lot of people in Washington who believe in these kinds of things. If I am in a big position and they give me a document, now you notice most of the people who actually fight tooth and nail for EITs are people who were appointed after the EIT program has been shelved. Mukasey, he was appointed as the attorney general after the EIT program was shelved. Hayden, after the EIT program was shelved, not before. So these guys, they give them a timeline, and that timeline is altered dates, and they believe that, and it's so highly classified that they probably cannot even read it in their own offices, you know, they have to take them to a special SCIF inside a SCIF inside a SCIF. And then you read into a document, wow, yes, we saved hundreds of thousands of lives, but where? Give me the hundreds of thousands of lives.

Q: The notes you have that still exist in files, and maybe with the senators, one of the things we're contemplating, persuading this blue ribbon panel to say, is those who do what you're saying, who claim it worked, but it's so classified we can't tell you...

A: Well, they told us. See, this is where we disagree, I mean, facts are facts. I can't actually lie about something, I can go in circles about it, but that does not change the fact that it's a lie. They told us how it worked, we see it in the declassified efficacy memos. We see it in the declassified OLC memos, we see it in the CIA IG, that they fought tooth and nail not to release, ok? They told us, but every fact that they told has been proven wrong, dates have been proven altered. So they told us, so now they are saying oh, we can't tell you. But no, I remember President Bush in '06, he told us on tv what happened.

Q: My other question is these things that are now, your files that are in the Bureau and the senators... when they claim national security, can't see it –I'm just asking for your opinion, if these were to be disclosed, would they compromise national security at this point?

A: No, not at all. They are declassifying documents that were found in bin Laden's house, for heaven's sake, you want to tell me that my notes on Abu Zubaydah's interrogation now are so classified? All these guys don't even exist, either they are dead or in Gitmo, or –phone numbers don't make sense anymore because we already discover it, I mean, come on.

Q: These are dated.

A: I mean everything. They mentioned the Heathrow plot, right?

Q: What are we talking about here?

A: This is the CIA declassified document about detainee reporting pivotal for the war against al-Qaeda.

Q: This is one of the ones that Cheney got declassified?

A: Yeah, this one, Cheney wanted it declassified. And the other one that Cheney wanted to declassify is the efficacy memo, which I think they don't want to declassify it because it's filled with lies and everybody who knows two things about terrorism is going to say bologna. And, you know how I –if you read the OPR report on the efficacy, the OPR report on the efficacy of Bradbury, they mention that they have a problem with the CIA efficacy memo, and you see page after page of just black and redacted stuff. But the redacted stuff are the problems, so why are they redacting the problems with it? So, here for example, we heard how we saved, from other people like the Senate and other, all these lives in Heathrow, right, in the plot for Heathrow. And at the time, if you remember, people from the UK, to include Peter Clark, who had counterterrorism –SO15 in the UK –he said bologna, we didn't receive any information from anyone about that, from the Americans, right? So they responded from here oh, what's he know, he's a cop? You know, ask MI6, MI5. MI6 was like, pfft, we have nothing to do with any of these things. So, here, we know that KSM, yes, divulged that information, but not because of waterboarding, not because of 183 sessions of waterboarding, like we were told. Look at what he said, shortly after his capture, in March of 2003, KSM divulged limited information about his plot to use commercial airlines to attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom. He discussed the plot probably –now they are saying why he gave the information –he discussed the plot probably because he suspected the key al-Qaeda September 11th facilitator and Heathrow Airport plotter Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had been detained six months previously, had already revealed the information. Ok, so this is –shortly after, after they capture him, he's like I'll cooperate, I'm telling you this information, which I can relate. I saw that a lot before, because –

Q: He's giving up something he thinks is easy to give up.

A: He's giving something because he thought Ramzi bin al-Shibh already gave it up. It is the ego, he thinks that he is way smarter and Ramzi bin al-Shibh is a weak guy. So I'm sure Ramzi bin al-Shibh, he believes, gave the information. So he gave that information. Not 183 sessions of waterboarding, and that's not me saying it. That is the CIA saying it.

Q: But that's in March 2003 also, before –

A: Right. Shortly after his capture, too, not 183 sessions of waterboarding after his capture.

Q: I need to ask Ali to make us a copy, so we have it, right?

A: And then, who had been detained six months previously. So this is –I mean, we can go one by one by one on how we get information, and how every plot that claim –and then, after we responded for every plot they claim, now they are saying well, it's national security, we cannot tell you what it is. Really? That's an easy escape out.

Q: I think I know about that. I've lived with it all my professional life.

A: So let me show you the one with...

Q: Ali, this is excellent because this goes right to the heart of what we're trying to put straight forward a factual case about.

A: I think I'm missing the document here. I'm missing the document that talks about when Ramzi bin al-Shibh was arrested, it's another document...

Q: We know you're generous with your time, I won't bother you again, but if we got any little follow-up things, we'll just pass them to Dan, shall we? But this is excellent, so where we were?

Q: You mentioned something about bin al-Shibh.

Q: Giving it up six months earlier.

A: That's according to CIA documents, that's what KSM thought. So it wasn't about enhanced interrogation techniques, it wasn't about waterboarding.

Q: I'm sorry, you're both much more fluent than I am –so that shows a plausibly theory of how and why he gave it up, right?

A: That shows why he gave up the information.

Q: Padilla.

A: But it shows, regardless, the fact that they were analyzing why he possibly gave –that means the information didn't come because of waterboarding. Otherwise, they would say he applied the ITs and he discussed that information. They said no, he gave it because he thought, maybe, Ramzi bin al-Shibh gave the information, that's they're thinking. We don't know, was he cooperating, we don't know.

A: We're talking about the Heathrow plot, we're talking about every plot that they claim.

Q: The speculation is that he gave up the Heathrow plot because he thought Ramzi bin al-Shibh did six months before. So my question is where is it that the other side claims that KSM gave up the Heathrow plot –

A: Everybody claimed it, do the research, read Thiessen talks, Bush.

Q: So that's all over.

A: This is one of the facts... You know, I'm only talking about their facts, their fact is we saved lives here, then –remember they came up with the other issue with the tower in LA, which is bologna.

Q: I was going to ask about that. We're looking at that in the middle –so it seems like they originally said, there is this new claim about the Ghuraba cell...

A: Ghuraba cell. I talk about it in the book, I don't know if they redacted it or not.

Q: No, they didn't. You said that they were sent back to their home countries...

A: They were sent back to their home countries. Look, let's say we're discussing something here, it does not mean that, you know, there's a lot of ideas, these guys always talk about ideas, you know, how they're going to do something. It does not mean that they actually took the step forward. It does not mean that there are actual operation cells going on, you know, to conduct a plot. And the people who wanted to conduct that plot –yes, there was a plot, and they were arrested in Southeast Asia, but they were arrested in February of '02.

Q: This is Masran Arshad?

A: The whole cell. It was those other people who wanted to do that, to hijack, so they took –what these guys wanted to do, with the threat about al-Ghuraba, because Hambali's brother is involved, and they put them together in a plot that didn't actually exist. I can make up things, do you know how many people I interrogated? I can actually take information from this guy, information from that guy, plot from here, put them together and come up with a plot, but it will be just like trying to –all these things, it seems to me like ok, we need to push back and we need to put something out. So let's, you know... but al-Ghuraba is a perfect example. If these guys really were so close to fly planes to the West Coast, do you think we were going to allow anybody to just send them back to their homes and be free? They would be in the secret jails.

Q: Right, and a lot of them were released, right?

A: They were released, they are free, all of them, not a lot of them. This is the time when we're taking people and sending them to third countries, for heaven's sake, and to jails, you know, secreted jails all over the world. And now we have people who are actually flying a plane, killing hundreds of thousands of people in LA, but guess what, we're going to release them. Doesn't make any sense, it does not pass the test of logic. Especially the main cell, that was planning to do these kinds of things, with the shoe bomb and stuff, that had been arrested in February of '02, before we even arrested Abu Zubaydah. And most of the claims has nothing, you know, most of the success, to be honest with you, has nothing to do with the US. We think we're the center of everything, you know, there are a lot of other services around the world that also do a good job in protecting their own countries. And they have their own sources, and they do their own thing, and they arrest their own people. Not everything that happens around the world, it must be like, we did something to stop it. Sometimes we do, sometimes we don't, sometimes other people help us to stop plots.

Q: Right. So one of the more specific claims they make about efficacy is that Majid Qan provided the phone number of this guy named Zubair, who's...

A: Right, the story –I went, regarding this story, and I got all the information regarding how we got Hambali, and I did it after I left the FBI, and I talked to people in Thailand and other people. I have the details of the case, and I told them I did not get access to this information when I was in the government. I talked to the people who interrogated Hambali and guess what they did, they redacted the whole thing from my book. So, the fact that they redacted –you know my position on this –and the fact that they redacted this information when Tennant talks about Majid Qan and the phone number, when Rodriguez talks about it, all these people talk about it, but when I'm putting it in context, then this thing has been redacted.

Q: So in general, the context has to do with Southeast Asian intelligence services doing their own investigation.

A: Yeah. There was information that we gave, but this is typical, you know, there's more –I wish I could, I don't want to get in trouble by saying something they redacted from my book, but let me tell you, it has nothing to do with waterboarding. And the fact that it's redacted, the two and a half, three pages, even though I did it independently, you know, and my research assistant, she's even Singaporean, she's not even US.

Q: She knows.

A: She knows, everybody knows. People we interrogated, the person who arrested Hambali. You know how the information came?

Q: But why were you doing this as a...(non-governmental person)

A: Because I wanted to basically target this issue, you know, in the book. The FBI allowed me, they said hey, you know, you didn't get it through us. They know I'm not wrapped into that specific issue.

Q: Do you know the guy, Ken Conboy, he's like a security consultant who seems to have close ties with the Indonesian intelligence service, do you know if he...

A: There's a lot of people close to this, so...

Q: He gives a detailed, or at least it sounds credible, but I don't know it in detail, so...

A: See, the problem is I can't... hopefully, if it's redacted from the book –and this is one of the things that we're saying? How can you redact something that I didn't get from my security clearance? Any journalist, you can go and get the information, and put the story out. So, and I mention, at the beginning, that I assisted by, you know, and how we got the information, and I thank my colleague who

helped me in Southeast Asia, I thank her, her name's in the book and everything, and they redacted it. Why did they redact it? Now, you know my position, you know my opinion. Actually, what's interesting about the redaction is that they prove it's right, they prove it's right, because you don't redact lies. If I'm saying a lie, you don't say ok, I'm going to redact it. What you will say, it's a lie, and this guy's a liar, and he has no credibility. However, when you redact something, you're actually proving that my research is very accurate.

Q: It's a confirmation.

A: It's a confirmation, because you only redact the truth, you don't redact a lie. You redact facts that you consider very sensitive to the national security of the United States. And I think because of all these things, the CIA is doing its own investigation of the classification...

Q: Of the classification system.

A: Absolutely.

Q: You saw the guy who runs it, said oh, no, no, but someone else is going to do the review, I think.

A: I don't know, we'll see.

Q: Well, I think one of the interesting things I read is that, as far as the information about the EIT, high-value detainee program that's been declassified, evidence of the fact that these –it broke up plots that led to capturing terrorists and it saved lives is one of about five facts that declassified about it. But presumably countervailing information, as a whole, is just not declassified.

A: Well, this is, again, this is a story of how it's changing over the years. Every time some more stuff is declassified, they come up with something else. Look, I agree with the CIA IG investigation. The CIA IG said that the CIA program, ok, was a success, it saved a lot of lives, ok? But the CIA program is not all EITs. And he actually separates between EITS and the CIA interrogation program, right? He said we disrupted a lot of plots, saved a lot of lives, got a lot of actionable intelligence, it's important intelligence, important information, from playing detainees against each other, from pocket litter, from –like phone numbers, for example, you mentioned phone numbers. When we get a detainee, we get his phone, we get all his information, we look into the pocket litter, we get a lot of intelligence from that. We go through the numbers. So it's not like, you know, you get a guy –not a piece of paper on him, then you put him on a chair, like in 24, and you start beating him, and you get the information. And suddenly he remembers any number. I can actually ask you for your best of friends, and you say do you know her number? No, you don't. Do you know his number? No, you don't, because everything is registered in the phone. And the terrorists have the same thing. So when you're arresting somebody in Pakistan, how the heck is he going to know not a phone in Pakistan, a phone number in Thailand, for heaven's sake. So that gives you an idea of how we probably get the number, ok? So they have phones, they have pocket litter, they're exactly like us, they have shit in their pockets, ok? And this is what the CIA IG said, that we

get a lot of information from that. And that makes sense. Computers, with significant amount of letters, information, when you go and do a search, you have all these documents, you have letters, you have people talking to each other, you know, they have messengers that are taking these letters of all the plots, about –so we have it, so that is very good intelligence that we got. And then you use it in the interrogation, ok? So the CIA program, yes it was the only program at one point that was going on, and yes, we saved a lot of lives. But you cannot mix those two together. So what's happening is they are trying to mix these two things together. And the people who are doing it are not really CIA people, the people who are doing it to the most part are political people.

Q: Are you aware of former CIA colleagues of yours who are at least partly as exercised and annoyed as you are?

A: I actually know a lot of them who are upset, I know at least one who left the agency because of that, who was with us. As I mentioned in my statement to the Senate, which was under oath, there is a CIA individual who actually left the site before me, he said screw it, we don't do that, before I even left.

Q: Is this the psychologist?

A: Yeah. There was a lot of CIA people who went and complained to the CIA.

Q: I know that, I was talking about something a little different, I think, not people who objected at the time, but people who, after the fact, where we are now, have the same fervor and annoyance you have about the claims about EIT.

A: Well, they go hand in hand, because those people were there, at least from the people that I know, they were there, and they saw the reality and they saw what really happened. So yes, those people –it goes hand in hand. Put yourself in the CIA. Twenty years working in the CIA, you recruited people, you did things around the world, you protected human sources, you had individuals talk to you about the deepest secrets of their own countries, and then they brought two contractors from outside, it's like you have to listen to them now. How do you feel?

Q: Did you meet both contractors, or just the one guy?

A: Just one.

Q: Well, so how do you feel about...

A: So now, you understand, hopefully, when you read the CIA IG, and the CIA IG starts with all these people who came and complained about the program to the IG. And that's why the IG initiated an investigation and that's why the program was shelved. See, the fact nobody talks about, that the program was shelved in 2005 under the Bush administration, if it was so effective, why did we shelve it in 2005?

Q: There are other answers to that question, and I don't know what's true, there are other answers that are not necessarily self-serving for the other side. And they are Abu Ghraib, the revulsion over Abu Ghraib. And one thing I was told that's in our report, tentatively at the moment, is that General McChrystal, at an NSC meeting, told Bush his view that it was crap, that he was getting better intelligence in Iraq from—

A: That has nothing to do with shelving the CIA program, two different things. I'll tell you why, because with the CIA-owned program, it was shelved because of the CIA IG report. They tried to put a lot of pressure on the CIA IG report – you can go back to the history, you can read it, it's all reported, there's nothing secret. It did not work.

Q: What's secret is the recommendations in the IG report.

A: Well, some of them you will read between the lines, I mean some of them have been declassified, there's a lot of thing that have been declassified in the CIA IG report. So, the program was shelved. The White House at the time gets really pissed off about the fact that the program was shelved. They wanted to reinstate the program, ok? The CIA asked for an OLC memo in '05 to reinstate the program. So that's actually at odds with what you're telling me. The CIA IG –at the time, a lot of the people refused in OLC, except Bradbury. And if you want all the facts about this, I know who was behind trying to reinstate it, it's all in the CIA, it's all in the OPR report, on the OPR of the OLC memos. So, they tried to do it, they had Bradbury write a memo to reinstate it, and guess what? It did not work. So there were people at the White House who wanted the program reinstated, and they instructed DoJ to prepare – the OLC, the Office of the Legal Counsel, to prepare a document to reinstate it. That was Bradbury. And that's why they have the CIA efficacy memo. The CIA efficacy memo was actually a response to the CIA IG.

Q: Got the sequence, that's great.

Q: But they didn't actually restart –when you say it did not work, you mean they didn't actually restart the program?

A: They didn't restart, because it didn't get that approval, the Bradbury memo –

Q: Even though it was a misleading memo.

A: It was a misleading memo, but it's misleading not because of Bradbury...

Q: Oh, what they told him.

A: And that's how we know that the efficacy was given to Bradbury for his legal opinion. So we know that from the Bradbury memo –

Q: The efficacy memo in its public form, people know about it because Bradbury cites it extensively.

A: Bradbury cites it, you told Padilla was picked up in May '03, you told us that this happened, you told us that this happened.

Q: And I, Bradbury, accepted that, that was my role.

A: He accepted it, and then he based the legal opinion on that, to reinstate –see, all the OLC memos in '02, August of '02. The only one in '05 is Bradbury, but nobody said why, why Bradbury is writing one in '05. Because the CIA killed the program, because of the CIA IG. So timeline is a really great thing, unless you don't want to go by it. And if I don't want to go by a timeline, I can tell you anything and people will repeat it because it became, unfortunately... I don't know, I hate to say it, but it became either a partisan issue, or an ideological issue, and....

Q: A reputational issue.

A: A reputational –but no, actually, the people who are trying to protect their reputation made it a partisan issue or an ideological issue, you know.

Q: I've often said in our own conferences, on the legal side, there's something to be said in admiration for John Yoo, he stuck to his guns. All the rest of them have run away.

A: Right. Look, I have no doubt, and I never said that some of these people who are behind –at the very beginning, I look at it at stage one –that they are not patriotic, that they didn't have the safety of the American people at hand.

Q: I absolutely believe they did.

A: I absolutely believe they did, I had no doubt about it, ok? And that's why, you know, we were just sitting there and waiting, saying ok, where is the efficacy? But then, we had a problem with it from a legal perspective, from a moral perspective, and from the efficacy perspective. The problem started, we start going our separate ways, is when they were taking information that we know how the information has been obtained, and claimed it was a result of a program that didn't exist at the time. This is what the problem is.

Q: And it's demonstrable that it was—

A: Then it became a snowball effect, you know. Then it's kind of like every time facts come in, then it became a partisan issue, it became a political issue, then it became an ideological issue –if you don't believe in the program, you're not a patriot, you know, and it went down that road. But if you go to all the facts, every fact that has been mentioned so fact publically, we have documents –not from us, it's not an FBI versus CIA, I hate when they say that, this is like one of the things that annoys the heck out of

me because, as you know from my book, I dedicated my book to the heroes of the CIA and the FBI. You know, I worked with these people, they protected my back, I protected their back, I was assigned overseas more than I worked –and when you go on the front lines with individuals, when you're in the middle of the belly's beast, alone, you have to actually only depend on the Americans who are with you. And at the time, we really don't care if you're and FBI or CIA or DoD or IMS and CIS, you know, we don't care about any of these things, we're all Uncle Sam. These things are all in Washington, this is Washington bologna. And you will see people who are political appointees, bureaucrats, people –I mean, read the OPR report, read the OPR report on the OLC, you will see. You will see the phone calls coming from the former Vice President's office, threatening people in the DoJ, you will see it. This is not me saying it, I didn't know any of these things at the time, because I wasn't at that level.

Q: I'm giving it a very close read right now.

A: I'm on a lower level, I didn't know, I'm an operational guy in the field, I didn't know any of these kinds of things. I started educating myself after I came back, and I think I knew that there was something going on there.

Q: There's this memo that Mitchell writes that says that he's the number three guy in al-Qaeda.

A: He's not an al-Qaeda member, and that's now actually, in Gitmo, even in –we never even claimed in the prosecution that he is an al-Qaeda member. That gives you an idea that when these guys—

Q: Did they know that was false at the time?

A: We knew that was false.

Q: Did they know? Did they convince themselves that he was really...

A: Well, you know what? They convinced themselves that he's the number three, yeah, absolutely. But the fact –and this is exactly between people who are in DC, you know, analysts who are people who are reading this stuff behind computer screens and people who worked Abu Zubaydah. The reason I, they flew me to interrogate Abu Zubaydah, or to help with the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, the reason I did that is because I was the case agent on the millennium plot in Jordan. And I know Abu Zubaydah very well, as the 9/11 Commission report mentions, I had one of the very few sources in Afghanistan, and that source was basically the focus on Abu Zubaydah before 9/11. So I know Abu Zubaydah very well and yes, Abu Zubaydah is not an al-Qaeda member. We knew that at the time, but the moment we arrested Abu Zubaydah, the President was saying he's the number three guy in al-Qaeda. We were like, wait a second, he's not al-Qaeda, what are you talking about, number three guy in al-Qaeda? And we have evidence that we caught with him that proves that he was not an al-Qaeda member. However, somebody told the President he's the number three, the President is happy we had a big success, and I believe President Bush is a very good person, I truly believe that, regardless of a lot of people who fight with me about this. I just feel that he's a good man, with a decent heart, he really cares about the

security of this country, however, he was ill-advised by people who are not telling him the truth around him. And these things, without going into details, I heard from so many different people how everything –this is a perfect example. Do you think President Bush said oh no, make him the number three, absolutely not? Somebody’s briefing him, they wanted to show about the success, they said number three. Now, he’s not admitting that he’s number three, and this is one of the things, you know, I mention in the book. If he’s not admitting he’s number three, then he’s not cooperating. Well, 83 sessions and he admitted he’s number three, even though we already claimed that we killed number three, which is Abu Hafs, Abu Hafs al-Masri, the commandant in December of ’01 in Kandahar. So it’s just like, you know, we kill number three, no, no, this is number three. Anyway... so, yes, absolutely, you know...

Q: Now there’s another story that first came out through the Ron Suskind book that –I think Dan Coleman read his diary and decided he’s actually, not only is he not number three, he’s actually just nuts.

A: Yeah, I admire Dan Coleman very much, I love Dan, and he’s wrong on this. You know why? He’s exactly in the same boat as the analysts in CIA who are determining that he’s the number three guy in al-Qaeda, based on information you’re reading, right? Dan did not know the context of the diary, and if you take something out of context and you read it, yes, he looks like an idiot. But there’s something going on and Abu Zubaydah told me about the reason of the diary and the reason of the diary was therapy because he lost his memory because of shrapnel that hits his head, so he had to basically regain his mental power in that any idea that comes to his head, he used to write it in order to remember it.

Q: So it was an exercise?

A: It was an exercise, so he tried to figure who he has, so three, four different personalities. So this is the reason behind the diary, it’s a therapy because of an injury.

Q: And that’s what he told his lawyers too, right? I know this from the various timelines.

A: And this is true. This is what he told us from day one, because I was with him, I was like dude, you’re freaking wacko, what the heck, is all this a con?

Q: Was he cognitively impaired, I mean, obviously...

A: Abu Zubaydah is probably one of the smartest people I ever interrogated in my life. He’s a borderline genius, I truly believe that. And he is not in any way –Abu Zubaydah is the only guy I didn’t discuss religion with, he is far away from being religious. I mean, he believes the ideology, he talks about the ideology and stuff like that, but it’s not his sole purpose. A lot of time, I felt that I’m talking to a Che Guevara, from what I read about Che, rather than I’m talking to an Islamic extremist. And it’s interesting that they mentioned, like I think that Rodriguez said that Abu Zubaydah was mad at me because I discussed religion with him, which basically I did not, and mad because he thought that I was bribing him

with candy, which Abu Zubaydah couldn't get candy because he was injured. He was in the hospital, he was injured, the guy was almost dying. We had a special diet planned for him, we couldn't even give him water, for heaven's sake, we used to put ice on his lips and stuff. So, that gives you an idea about how, you know, he probably read what other individuals in the FBI used to say, like I bring dates and fruit and tea –and the military, they mentioned a lot of things about my style, I sit down and talk to these guys, discuss religion, not like in a fighting way, in a regular way, so they know that I know...

Q: To facilitate talking.

A: To build a rapport, absolutely, So he read this, and then probably somebody told him ah man, if they discuss religion, they would be so pissed off. So they made things up that aren't accurate, because that's never happened with Abu Zubaydah.

Q: So you should know that we, in our, we approach this, the staff on the task force, with exactly the same view that you expressed a few minutes ago, that whomever we criticize and however much error we find in some of these early policies, we do not question anybody's patriotism, we assume in fact, that they were exercising their best efforts in protecting their country. We're not an outraged –we're like you, trying to improve for the future. So, and we will be reflecting that in the report, so I'm glad you have a—

A: I have no doubt in my mind that these guys –but unfortunately when you're dealing sometimes with political people, and sometimes there's individuals who're trying to protect their legacy.

Q: That's a separate matter.

A: It's becomes an ideology, when you try to do this and you go down that route, nothing positive can come out of it.

Q: I believe that people who implemented and formulated policy did it with good motives, for the most part, however, now in the hindsight issue, the people who were trying to rewrite what happened, I do not view them with admiration. So we have –I wanted you to know that we have taken a lot of your time, but we probably have a few more questions if you have a few more minutes, you call it on us, my colleague probably has a few more... and you tell us.

A: Yeah, sure.

Q: (?), did he mention a learned helpless with you, when he was explaining what he was doing?

A: No. And even if he did, I don't remember. I mean, this is –the first time, he was talking about his theories, about what he wanted to do. We were there for about ten days, we were working day and night, because Abu Zubaydah was all, you know, with his medical situation, so the interrogations can be

at any time. So, I don't remember what, you know, but I know when he mentioned what he mentioned, we're looking at each other like, this guys is... (whistles).

Q: So, it's in Newsweek that you saw the confinement boxes in the room, and that's when you left. How soon after –when was that?

A: I don't remember...

Q: May?

A: May, absolutely May, but the date exactly, I don't remember.

Q: And then the –when you went to Afghanistan, or wherever, to interrogate bin al-Shibh, bin Attash, did you –how did that happen? You were going from Guantanamo?

A: I cannot say what's the location where we interrogate them, I can say only that –where's the location that we pick them up from, which is Karachi. I travelled from here, from New York.

Q: And do you remember the 45 minutes with bin al-Shibh, do you remember what date that was?

A: Well, let's see, it has to be around 16 or 17, just because of dates, you know, you leave here September 11, you arrive to Pakistan maybe the 12th or the 13th because of the type, and then from Pakistan you go to another location, you arrive really at night, the other day is when you cannot have access at all –it has to be the 16th or the 17th when we first interrogated them.

Q: Ok, and they were transferred to... you know, there's a report in the press, where they were transferred to...

A: They were transferred to two different undisclosed countries, locations.

Q: Right. And were those... with bin al-Shibh –I knew about bin Attash going to Jordan with bin al-Shibh, I think he was to Morocco –wherever he was transferred, was he under CIA control or did the foreign intelligence service take over, or do you not know?

A: I prefer not to discuss this. Just because of, again, classification issues.

Q: If you do not object to our asking, we do not object to your declining.

Q: Ok, no problem. But you wrote in the book that you thought that the intention of the rendition was that they would be tortured. Was that...

A: I said in the book, to get the information, not... I don't think that they, I never mentioned exactly that the idea was.... It's an assumption, that when you take them to countries like this, you're taking them to be interrogated by someone else, you believe that that someone else can get information that you cannot get. However, there was discussions at that time that we, because both of them, we believe – regardless of the name of the second guy, or the identity of the second guy, but at least bin al-Shibh has, because bin al-Shibh has been in the DOJ IG –the information was, the fact was that both of them were cooperating. And the second guy gave information that could have stopped the plot.

Q: The second guy is the guy about the Yemeni.

A: Yes. Which basically you can read between the lines, because the redaction was done in a bad way, they redacted some elements, but towards the end they cut some elements, so you can figure out what is the plot that he gave. And this is only with about –and the interesting thing is that they redacted some stuff about he cooperated, and he cooperated not because of anything else, not because of religion, not because –he cooperated because he found out, he knew who I was. He already knew of me, because I interrogated his... someone he knows, let's put it to you this way.

Q: And the Cole investigation?

A: Connected. You can look at it, I mean I don't know how... it's so annoying when they redact, like, three lines, they keep a line, three lines, a page, it's just like you don't know, exactly. But I think between the lines, you both can figure out why.

Q: We can deal with that. The word apparently is a very useful word, for outsiders, it means we are inferring.

A: Right. And these things all will happen, I mean, eventually they're going to put him in court. I have to testify, if they had them in court ever, if they didn't them instead of prosecuting them, because it's going to show up how this whole program was a sham.

Q: Are you going to testify in the 9/11 trial, do you know?

A: I have no idea. I've been approached by many prosecutors on different cases. I already testified on a few of the cases in Gitmo and a few of the other cases. At least two of them already pled guilty, after I met with the defense attorney, they pled guilty, the two Sudanese guys. And I testified on Hamdan, testified on Bahlul, and I'm going to be probably testifying on some of those guys...

Q: Testified on Bahlul? In Guantanamo?

A: Mm-hmm. I got the confession from him, I was on the stand for a long time, yeah. I got the confession from him and from Hamdan. And also from the two Sudanese guys, who was close to bin Laden –one of them was very close to bin Laden, the other one was close with Abu Zubaydah.

Q: Well, some of these guys speak English. Do you speak to them in Arabic, usually?

A: It depends, you know these guys are all Arabic, I spoke with them all in Arabic, those guys. The ones that I mentioned, but other individuals, no, I speak English with them. I mean, with Abu Zubaydah I spoke English more than Arabic sometimes.

Q: More English than...

A: Sometimes, yeah. He's fluent.

Q: Completely fluent. I'm fascinated how you were impressed with his intellectual capacity, that's fascinating.

A: No, I mean, he's smart. One day we were talking about things, and he's giving me a big lecture about colloquialism and how, for the sake of keeping world prices, you know, the US destroyed thousands of tons of fruit that can feed the world two times over, and stuff like that. And how corporations are actually running the world, running America, and the big companies, big corporations, globalism, he's going, like, off. So I'm, you're giving me a headache man, I'm going to go and get me a cup a coffee or something, do you want anything? And I was leaving the cell, and he said yeah, get me a pepsi. And I looked at him like, after all this lecture, really? And then he said to me ah man, you caught me with this one. He said you caught me with this one. But this is the dynamic between me and him... A lot of these stories, I don't know, this I think has been public, but the others, you know –there's a lot of stories that you see the dynamics and what we're talking about, and that's how we got the information, you know, that important information. The Senate knows the context. So if you take the information and you say well, the context is classified, but it's waterboarding. What? No! Because at the time, waterboarding wasn't even discussed. So I think what's happened with the Senators and with a lot of people who are reading all these things, the reason there's a lot of people changing their minds and stuff is because now they know the truth, the context of how these things happened, and these things happened because of, you know, discussion. And he was very, I mean, he wasn't an easy guy, because he's smart. It's kind of like a mental game, you know, playing a mental game with him. I had to play some tricks too, actually, it's like the Art of War, right? Sun Tzu? It is the art of war in the interrogations, that's how the interrogations worked with Abu Zubaydah.

Q: It is an art, you are an experienced artist. Colonel Harrington... so we know you're opposed to EITs, more or less, not effective, but Colonel Harrington, an interrogation expert, says he is too, but he does believe in the isolation, to help with the rapport building, and make the interrogator more central.

A: Isolation, we do it even in federal court, we do it in federal jails –isolation, I don't call it even an enhanced interrogation technique.

Q: Exactly, but you find it a wise and useful element often, right?

A: Yeah, absolutely, sometimes you do, it depends on the setting. When you have an individual, ok, who's very high up, who's involved in so many things, do you actually take him back and put him in the camp with 600 other al-Qaeda guys? You will be dumb if you do that! No, you have to take him and put him in a different cell, alone. And guess what? All the guys that we have convicted, in federal courts, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Omar Abdel Rahman –sorry, not Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ramzi Yusuf, Omar Abdel Rahman, al-Walid, all the guys who we convicted, ok? How do you think they are in the security max prison in Colorado? All of them are in isolation, 23 hours of the day, they are in isolation, they get one hour outside every day. That's it. That's normal. Isolation has been used in Guantanamo, it's legal.

Q: I meant isolation for interrogation, these guys are beyond interrogation now, aren't they?

A: They're beyond interrogation, but we're talking about the tactic, the isolation tactic. This is legal. This is something that we do in our federal jails, in our state and local jails, all the time. Now, we do it for interrogation, we do it for other purposes, that doesn't matter. But the fact that you're taking an individual and you put him in isolation, ok, you're not breaking any laws. The fact that you're waterboarding a guy, you're breaking some laws, that's two different things. We don't waterboard people in our jails in the US. We put people in isolation in jail in the US, yes. Isolation, I don't think of it as –you take a guy out of his support network, yes, absolutely, why not? I don't think of it as a technique. And it wasn't actually one of the techniques anyway, because you assume that each one of them is going to be isolated anyway, these detainees.

Q: Is the ICRC, is them having access to the ICRC also a problem, or is it just –

A: Well, it depends on the context, sometimes. I think, to the most part, a lot of these guys have access in Guantanamo, when they get to Guantanamo they do have access. But there is also, sometimes, that you have to determine one's access. I mean, you get a guy who's involved in killing Americans, and you're trying to stop a plot, you don't arrest him and say ok, let's bring them the Red Cross, you know, you have to –but after the interrogation phase is done, I believe yes, absolutely, and he's in jail, and he's waiting to be tried, why not? Absolutely, have him have access. And that's actually, to be fair, we're doing that, the US is doing that?

Q: Anything else? You call us on the time, if you have to...

A: No, no, go ahead.

Q: We'll go as long as we're not out of breath.

A: No, you guys came all the way from DC. I'm good until, like, 1:00, 1:15, I'm good.

Q: Ok. So one thing you mentioned, you actually found the Manchester manual?

A: Yeah.

Q: I looked it up online and it's cited as evidence that they always make false claims of torture.

A: Mm-hmm, true.

Q: But it actually tells them to expect to be tortured?

A: Yes. The Arabic one, I don't know what kind of translation that you have, but the Arabic copy is a hand-written copy, that's the one that we found, and it was in a house of a Libyan fighting group slash al-Qaeda guy in Manchester, that's why you call it the Manchester Manual, it is not called –you know, the document itself is not called the Manchester document. And there was a lot of these manuals, not only the Manchester, but in other places, we found similar manuals, that say about urban warfare, how to establish cells, how to –you know, basically if you're part of an operation and you get caught, you hold on for about 48 hours that gives time to the guys to do all their plans before you start talking. But then they tell them about one of the techniques, what the bad guys, which the bad guys are us, what they are going to do to them, like bringing their sisters or their wives, and raping them in front of them, and stuff like that. And this is something that, you know, it happens in some...

Q: Other countries.

A: Jail. So this is what they are expecting. So our idea is to go back and say ok, enhanced interrogation techniques, as disgusting as it is to some people, from a moral perspective, from nudity to waterboarding, and everything in between, with all due respect, it's nothing comparing to what these guys are expecting to receive in jails in some Middle Eastern countries. Like Egypt, for example, under Hosni Mubarak, that's nothing compared to what they are expecting, typically. So why do you want to go on a route with an interrogation, ok, with an individual that, less than half a way on that path, you're going to hit a glass ceiling. And our glass ceiling is waterboarding. And then what happens after that? After that, the detainee is going to call your bluff, the know there's nothing you can do more than waterboarding. So what do you do? You keep repeating that technique again, and again, and again. With Abu Zubaydah, 83 times, with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 183 times. And now they tell us how, it's like oh no, waterboarding wasn't that bad, you know, as Mr. Rodriguez said, KSM was counting to ten until the session is over. Oh, so basically, that is working. He already called your bluff. He's waiting, ok, one, two, three, four... ok, you're done? Ok, oh yeah, where were we? If the detainee is actually counting until, he waits until the... you know? So why do you want to go on a path, then you're going to say ok, let's go back and go on another path. It doesn't work like this with interrogation. So these guys are expecting to be tortured. So basically, when you take them and put them on a path that they believe it's heading towards torture, and then they hit a glass ceiling, you actually –they think they won. They think they won the game with you, because there's nothing you can do beyond that.

Q: And you run out of ammunition.

A: You run out of ammunition, and they know it. That's why KSM's counting, he knows it's ten seconds and it will stop. Then, what happens after that? What happens after that, when you go on that path, you

hit a glass ceiling, and the detainee won. In that process, the moment that you do the nudity, and you go that path, you actually put that individual in their own comfort zone. You know why? Because that's what they are expecting, they are expecting to be tortured.

Q: I haven't heard that before, that's very fascinating.

A: Mentally speaking, I'm talking here as an interrogator, they are expecting –think of it as a mental chess game –they are expecting to be tortured, so you actually put them in their own comfort zone, and you give them a sense of predictability about what's happening to them. So they are predicting what's happening to them, and they want to see, ok how much can we endure, how much can we endure? And suddenly, you hit waterboarding, and then there's nothing else you can do, except waterboarding. So he knows he's not being electrocuted, he knows his nails aren't coming out, he knows his mother or his sister or his wife is not going to be raped in front of him, he knows there's not a dog who's going to sodomize him, he knows that these things are not happening.

Q: He's seen the worst.

A: Yeah, or he heard at least about the worst. So you give him a sense, you put him in a sense of this predictability. So now, he has a sense of predictability, he knows where he's going until you hit the glass ceiling. This is from a real life experience. Now when I watch Hollywood, that's different story. But I can guarantee you, the Hollywood gun doesn't run out of ammunition either, you know, so if you're going to a gun fight, take a lot of bullets with you. Don't believe Hollywood.

Q: So you believe, the guy—

A: I actually said that in my statement to –read my statement on the Senate website. Actually, they redact a portion of my statement to the Senate in my book, even though it's on the senate dot gov. So, read my statement, and I talk about these kinds of things.

Q: So once the guy has gone to the max, and sees it's the max because it's repeated.

A: Right, 183 times, so they're not doing anything else.

Q: It's repeated, he knows that's the limit, he gets accustomed to it.

A: Well, he gets accustomed to the whole process, not only the max. When I catch you, and you're an al-Qaeda person, you're expected that you're going to be tortured, you're not expecting that somebody is going to come to you with a cup of tea. So then, you already have a sense of predictability, that sense of predictability goes beyond the treatment. The sense of predictability goes –I claim to the essence of your belief, the reason you joined al-Qaeda, the reason you want to blow up yourself and Americans, the reason you're willing to die and sacrifice everything because you believe we are so evil. We're going to torture you, we're going to do all these bad things to you, because we're the great Satan, we're the

head of the snake. So we catch you, and we actually put you on a path that you're actually proving what bin Laden said to you is true. That's the sense of predictability. It has a lot of ideological components to it. So you're going to hold to what you believe in, because you want to try to believe –as an Islamic extremist, as a religious fanatic –you want to see how much can you endure. It a concept that also exists in Christianity, with a passion, you know, the cross that you're given, how much can I endure, ok, with torture. But then you're going to hit waterboarding, and then they're all like that's it? Seriously? This whole process is like giving tea in some other country. The EITs that we have is like nice treatment in some other countries.

Q: You think that an individual who's subjected to waterboarding multiple time...

A: He calls the interrogator's bluff, absolutely.

Q: He does not think, in your view, he does not think well, they waterboarded me a hundred times, they may kill me on the hundred and first.

A: Why does he think that?

Q: You're telling me no?

A: No, I don't believe so, because he knew.

Q: It's just more discomfort.

A: All the other processes go fast until you hit the waterboarding...

Q: And then it's repeated.

A: It's repeated. If the technique is working, and this is where we have to put a little bit of common sense, a little bit of critical thinking, which is the most uncommon thing in today's world, if a technique works, why do you want to do it 83 times? Why do you want to do it 183 times? To break –because the mentality, the EITs, the whole justification, that it's going to break their will to resist, it's a strategic approach to break their will to resist, and this has been written by the claims, and then they will be like an open book, they will totally cooperate with you, they'll totally give you everything you need, ok? So 183 times doesn't tell me that they're totally cooperating, and you're opening them up.

Q: But what if the other side says yeah, we failed with them, but the other 11, they folded after one or two times.

A: Actually, they never claimed that either. But you can tell them that, maybe that's a good way to respond to some of these things.

Q: There's this story that Rodriguez repeats, it's in Thiessen's book, it's in Bush's memoirs, about Zubaydah after waterboarding, it says that this somehow freed him in some religious fashion, and there's the quote, you must do this for all the brothers. Do you know...

A: Ask Abu Zubaydah about that.

Q: We would...

A: Ask Abu Zubaydah. That's bologna. Yeah, torture everyone, great. You're talking to a terrorist, again, let's put everything in context. Was he being sarcastic? Because I gave you a story that gives you an idea about Abu Zubaydah. Was he being sarcastic, is he being...

Q: Because he's a clever fellow.

A: He's a clever fellow. You don't know the context, you don't know if that even being said, because I know some of the reports that had been written, and I read, ok, especially by the contractors about their psychology analysis of Abu Zubaydah. They are so wrong and there's a lot of bologna in these reports, made up stuff. So there's a lot of falsehood.

Q: Do you think the psychological profile, do you think there's knowingly false stuff in there?

A: I don't know about intent, I don't like to talk about intent, but yes. For example, the number three guy in al-Qaeda. Another thing, again, critical think, I love, like I said, that the psychologist is doing a report about a person, that he needs some psychological assessment. Like for example, they say that Abu Zubaydah is so independent, and he values his independency, so he pledges bayat to bin Laden. If there was a statement that's so wrong, the bayat is giving away your independency totally, and obeying the leader, so if the leader tells you die, die. If the leader tells you tomorrow hey, you know what, you're the head of operations, now I give you an order to be a cook, you have to be a cook. And it would be a violation to God if you don't do that, not to the leader, because you already gave him a bayat as your leader, an oath of allegiance as your leader. So how can Abu Zubaydah be so independent, but he rose quickly and he gave a bayat to bin Laden? It doesn't make any sense. That's the main reason –actually there's two reasons –but one of the main reasons that Abu Zubaydah didn't give a bayat because he wanted to be independent, he wanted to be his own boss. He could help bin Laden, he believes in bin Laden, but he doesn't want to be a member of al-Qaeda.

Q: And then there's the claim that he was one of the planners for September 11th?

A: No. He knew about September 11th, he gave some ideas, he discussed it with KSM, but all this information he told me. So when it comes to his role in 9/11, I don't think there's anyone who knows more, because I spent days with him discussing this issue. He's definitely not a planner. He knew about it because KSM came to him first and talked to him. And what was mentioned to me, what he told me is basically the whole discussion and how KSM went and talked to bin Laden, and then bin Laden told him

hey, why do you want to go to war with an axe when you can go with a bulldozer? That was in Arabic, I had to translate. Axe, bulldozer, I was just like what the heck, I have to translate that. But, you know, George then talked about it in his book. That's something that he gave us when we were with him.

Q: Do you have a view as to the current state of the war against al-Qaeda? Whether the drones have killed so many of them that they're decimated in personnel...

A: I think al-Qaeda today is more dangerous than it was before.

Q: Through its affiliates?

A: Yeah, through the affiliates, because now we used to have Waziristan, and now have Waziristans all over the place. We have a place twice the size of France in North Africa, in the north of Mali, we have areas, pockets, in south of Yemen, we have areas now because of Syria, that they are operational at. So it's expanding.

Q: And fragmenting.

A: Yeah, but each one...

Q: No, fragmenting in a good way for them.

A: It is a good way for them, absolutely, because there is some sense of cooperation between the different elements, but now each one is focused onto different issues, you know, in their own region. They learn from the past, you know, this whole global jihad movement is not working for them very well. So they are trying to domestic..

Q: Domestic, regional.

A: The near enemy, rather than the foreign enemy. But I think when they become very comfortable, then I think you're going to see a different threat. So when the threat is different –we're killing lot of people, and that's good, with the drones, I mean, this is good, but this is a tactic, this is not a strategy. And you don't win war just be tactics.

Q: It will not end it that way.

A: Yeah, that won't end al-Qaeda, absolutely. Because al-Qaeda now became an ideology more than it became an operation. The core group of very small members, very small core, and they are active, and it's good that we're getting them out of the picture, and it's good that we're targeting them, but we're only targeting them in specific areas, and al-Qaeda now is bigger than these areas, these specific areas.

Q: And what do you say when people ask you what is the best explanation for why we have not been struck again, here on the mainland.

A: First of all, we have to give ourselves some credit. We spent hundreds of billions of dollars on Homeland security, we're fighting al-Qaeda overseas, we're killing them.

Q: But the people who are mystified by this, a simple plot, for publicity sake, as well as...

A: And they tried and we stopped them, they tried so many times here, and they were stopped. Either we stopped them, or they were so stupid as to carry out the plot, thank god, I'll take stupidity and luck...

Q: Certainly luck in some of those cases, Times Square.

A: The Times Square bombing, that's stupidity, the guy didn't know how to put the bomb together. With Abdel Mutaleb, it was luck, you know, with different guys, they were dealing with individuals who are trying –because we disrupted the communication of al-Qaeda, because we disrupted their havens for training and operations, because we destroyed many of their leadership, because we stopped a lot of the funding and the money. So now they operate over chat rooms, and trying to recruit –this is a homegrown terrorism, what we call it –so they try to recruit individuals, convincing them to join al-Qaeda, to do operations. And fortunately, so far, every time they did that in the United States, we were basically a step ahead, and these guys, you know, they met al-Qaeda when al-Qaeda came over to recruit them, and al-Qaeda was a federal agent. And I had that myself, in one of the cases, and I did an undercover myself. So, luckily, we've been ahead, I mean, al-Qaeda are not geniuses, but they have been trying to... I think we have a lot of, due to the efforts of the intelligence community and the law enforcement community, we have been successful. Now, the thing that I don't agree with, it's because of EITs. EITs were only for a few years, it stopped, and since '05, it was for three years, and we still say it.

Q: I have a question about, just a general question, anyone you recommend we speak to, who might be willing to speak to us, of your former colleagues? We're especially interested in speaking to Gaudin, if you're still in touch with him...

A: Steve is still in the FBI. Yeah, I'm still in touch with him, he's not the lead guy in Abu Dhabi, but he's still with the Bureau, so you need to go through the FBI to get to him.

Q: Ok. And then what about the people who interviewed, the guys who were getting stuff from al-Libi...

A: They are still in the FBI, I have George Crouch, he's in the FBI, he's in ASAC in Cleveland, I believe. George is a good guy. There is also, I think, with him was, if I'm not mistaken, Russ Fincher, who's still in the FBI too.

Q: Did you know about that at the time, or did you find out later, about al-Libi...

A: No, we knew about when they were interrogating him then.

Q: And did you know about earlier renditions, like the Albania case in the 90s...

A: I mention in the book, yeah, I was involved with some of these things, with the Albania operations.

Q: Do you think the renditions changed after... I mean, were the early guys tortured?

A: I don't know, I don't what happens to them, but I know that –you have a bunch of guys... we have to put it also, again, I like to put things in context, because a lot of times, if it's not in context, it doesn't make any sense. What you have is some people trying to blow up something, let's say an embassy in country x. You do an operation and you round them up, ok. Now, you don't have enough evidence, because a lot of the evidence is the human sources, or sensitive sources, that you don't want to burn. So, basically, you cannot build a case, and you don't to appear as if you're the policeman of the world, everyone gets arrested, you know, bring them, prosecute them, and stuff like that. However, a lot of these guys are wanted in their own country, and their own country tells the host country we want them. We want them, and the other country was going to kick them out anyway. So yes, they go back to that country. Yes, we stop the plot from happening. So this is where we get involved. Now, is this a rendition? This is kind of like, this is one of these very vague... in national security, there's nothing called black and white, we live in different shades of gray. Some shades are darker than others. But I honestly didn't think at the time, and we were involved in many of these things, and this is public knowledge now, that we knew about it, but you know what? We have a guy, he's a killer, he killed a lot of people, he's trying to blow up some places, and you catch him. Now, he didn't kill Americans yet, but his country's saying hey, he killed a lot of people here, we want him. So he goes back. Is this rendition? I don't know. I don't know what you call it. I call it that if we had a guy from the United States, killed a lot of people overseas, he gets caught overseas, guess what? We want him back to be prosecuted here. And who are we to judge what's happening –

Q: As I understand it, before September 11th, it was always back to whatever country they came from originally.

A: Or wanted, in some other countries. And sometimes it's the United States. Believe it or not, they used to ask the guy, where is it you want to go? I'll give you an example, in Nairobi, with al-Walid. Part of the deal that he start talking, that he wanted to come to America, and in a federal court, he wanted to explain why he did what he did. With another guy, with Khalfan Khamis Mohamed I believe, it was ok, you can go back to Tanzania, because we caught him in South Africa, he was involved in the East African embassy bombings too, you can go back to Tanzania, or you can go back to the United States, which one? Before you even finish the statement, the United States. So you give them sometimes –so every case was different, and there was a lot of different things with it. But I believe a program, literally, is –I don't believe a program is an evil program, I think, or the technique or the tactic isn't evil.

Q: It's how it's used, how it's applied.

A: Absolutely. They were trying to do something bad, they were trying to kill people, you stopped them from killing people, what do you do with them? They don't meet the threshold to have a case in the US, they didn't even attack –you know, there was a conspiracy to attack and stuff –but the world before 9/11 was different than the world after 9/11.

Q: Now, I think it's really easy to prosecute anyone, or maybe it's not easy to prosecute, but there's always a substantive offense, material support or some such, right? But before that, there's not if they're...

A: We always had material support... and we used it sometimes in the East African embassy bombings, like for example, we used it with al-Hajj, I believe, we arrested people... but the world was different. The world was different before 9/11. And the world was different before the World Trade Center bombing, the first one. And the world became more different after the East African embassy bombing, and more different after the USS Cole, and more different after 9/11. You have to put it in the context of what's happening at the time. I'll give you an example. Bin Laden already killed hundreds of people, he had the Cole, he had the East African embassy bombing, he had plots, declare Jihad on America, the declaration of Jihad of 1996, the fatwa of 1998 to kill Americans and plunder their money. We arrested all these guys who were involved in the East African embassy bombing. We actually indicted bin Laden in June of 1998, the first overt attack of al-Qaeda was August 1998. So bin Laden and his top people were indicted before they did the East African embassy bombing, in a sealed indictment in the Southern District of New York. So a lot of people don't know that, we were focusing on the target, we had sources, we had a lot of them. The East African embassy bombing happened, we arrested a lot of people. We prosecuted them in the Southern District of New York, bin Laden was crushed because some of these guys were so close to him, very close to him. When we were in Yemen, November after the USS Cole –so again he killed 17 sailors, injured 39, almost sank a ship –in November, I believe, the conviction came down on the East African bombing suspects, and all of them were found guilty. The next day, I mean this guy has blood on his hands, if you go to the transcript of the East African embassy bombing, everything you know about al-Qaeda today was discussed, the structure of al-Qaeda, the Shura Council, everything, go to the transcript and you can read it. What do you think the first page of the newspapers in New York were? The second day, you know it happened let's say today the verdict came, the second day it's going to be in the paper, because this is when it is published, guilty on all counts for everyone, what do you think the very first page of the Daily News, and the New York Post, and all these papers were? The club shooting, when Jennifer Lopez was dating P. Diddy that took place in Brooklyn. It didn't even make the first page. And that, by that time, that was the trial of the century for terrorism. We get guilty for people who killed hundreds of people in East Africa, killed 17 sailors, killed member –bin Laden himself was found guilty, in a way, in absentia. This is the world that we're living in, that is November of 2000 that I'm talking about, not far away, November of 2000.

Q: As you say, the world changed.

A: Changed. So we can't just look at something that happened before in a different context of what happened today. And these are the tools that are available. Bin Laden declared war, and our response

was ok, you guys have been charged with this war, but we have limited tools in our tool box, and I think we did okay with the tools that we had in our toolbox.

Q: I'm very grateful for your explanation as to why you think disrupted communications, organization, havens...

A: Killing members. Look, al-Qaeda is not a big organization. On the eve of 9/11, al-Qaeda had 400 people. That's it, pledge members. We have the membership lists, we found them in Afghanistan. So it's not like it's a secret. Then it became an ideology, and then more people start jumping in. And we killed many of them, between Operation Anaconda, between the Toa Bora, between the people who were able to Afghanistan, we picked them up –sorry, to Pakistan –and we picked them up and we sent them to Guantanamo Bay, between the people who went back to their homelands, and they wanted to do operations, and I talked in detail about many of these guys, for example in the Arabian Peninsula and in Yemen, and how we were able to pick them up in Yemen and arrest them. You know the whole thing in Yemen started with 22 people. We put them all in jail, we prosecuted them, because the US government decided that they would be prosecuted in Yemen. So after you put your life on the line getting these assholes, I went back and I worked with the prosecutor general, Said al-Aqel, and the attorney general at the time in Yemen, to prosecute them. All of them were found guilty, put in jail, they dug a tunnel and they escaped.

Q: Yeah, there was an escape –

A: Yeah. Nasser al-Wuhayshi's a leader now, Qassim al-Raimi, all these guys. I talk about their stories in detail in the book. So it's like twenty people and they were able to build alliances with tribes, and then al-Qaeda became an ideology and it became bigger. But a lot of these guys, the new guys, were not in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan there were very few people.

Q: But if we know, in a similar way, a small number of people who were threats, I have an idea of the roster, you said earlier one of the detainees, I forget, it's in my notes, decided to speak to you because he he'd heard of you, he knew of your reputation.

A: Not necessarily heard of the interview reputation, in a way, you can say that, but he knew of me because I told him a story that nobody knows except –and I didn't mean to tell him the story because of... just a story, but I told him a story that nobody knows, or he heard of, from his mother. And he gave me a hug, he started crying, and he said my mother prayers for you every day.

Q: Oh, that's what you meant.

A: What do you know? He started crying like a baby, this tough guy who didn't give a shit about anything.

Q: And you had learned this from talking to the mother, or talking to other people... Somebody?

A: I was telling him about somebody else, and that somebody else mentioned the information to the mother... again, hopefully one day you will be able to read it unredacted, or you will hear me testify about it in court.

Q: That's one that's off-limits at the moment.

A: I don't know if it's off-limits or not, I don't think there's anything that can jeopardize sources or methods. There's no classified information.

Q: It shouldn't be off-limits, but it might be.

A: It is so... like if I say, for example, I waterboarded the guy and he gave me the information, then it won't be off-limits. Then they would probably put me on every tv station, like what they did with John Kiriakou, you know, he said 35 seconds –this is before it became the fact that it's 83 times –35 seconds or three seconds, I think, or something like that, and the guy starts singing. It's as if somebody put the light switch on. It was on every television station, remember that?

Q: Yeah, and I remember wondering it sounded like he heard that, it didn't sound like he did that.

A: So if I said I waterboarded him, they would be like absolutely, put it in, it's unredacted, you can do whatever you want with it. Like we see with Rodriguez and with other people. But when I say ok, let's put it in the context of how we got the information –the context, these people hate the context, do you know why they hate the context? Because most of the American people are reasonable people, it makes sense, they believe it, that it makes sense. So if these guys are killers, and they don't understand reason, waterboarding is the only thing that works with them, torture is the only thing that works with them, people understand it, and then they will support it because it's saving lives. But when you say exactly how we put it, how we get the information, and put it in the context, that's not good. So that's why the context is way more important for them, that's why they redact the context, they allow it only if it's torture, but if it's not torture, they redact it.

Q: I'm glad I asked that, because you disclosed something that's a fascinating anecdote, without the details is fine. But I was getting to a different point, that you have a reputation, surely you do now – book, appearances –do you think about you being on someone's list?

A: What list?

Q: I don't know, an al-Qaeda list to...

A: I had a lot of threats. I don't know, I can't live my life like this, but definitely I had a lot of threats on me, that's why, if you recall, when I testified first in the Senate, they put me behind a blanket. And this is because, you know, the Senate –usually they don't allow this, very, very few cases, legally, that they allow this, but they have in their hands the threats from al-Qaeda against me, as a person. Yes, I had a

lot of threats. But you know, I cannot live my life like this, I cannot think about the threats, and years have passed, many of these guys are either in jail or killed, the ones that gave the threats. But you're dealing sometimes with some kind of an institution too, so these might still be there, but you cannot live like this, you cannot live your life like this.

Q: I think one last question. You mentioned about one of the interesting features is plots that weren't stopped, like you mentioned the Jakarta Marriott, which is very striking because it's right before Hambali's captured, and they're claiming about this imminent plot on the Library Tower, and meanwhile there is this ticking bomb in Jakarta that goes off. And you mentioned London and Madrid. Do you think, is it just that attacks still happen, or do you think that other means of interrogation could have actually stopped them?

A: I think this is, again, an opinion, I don't want to talk about... but what is, if you know how al-Qaeda operates, and when you have Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as a military commander for al-Qaeda who's in charge of every cell around the world, and he gives them instructions. And he gets caught, and we don't pick up any of the cells around the world, what does that tell you? It's just a very simple question, regardless of intelligence, regardless to what I know, what I don't know. I am, you catch me, and I am in charge of every sleeper cell around the world, I know who are the people who came to training, who are the people who are willing to do operations..

Q: And he does have that level of knowledge.

A: Absolutely. Al-Qaeda is not this huge institution, it's all under his fingertip. And you don't stop anything, you don't pick up any individuals. For example, some of the guys, at least one of the guys in London, he went and he got trained in Waziristan when KSM was there. So why didn't we know about him? KSM gave 100,000 dollars or 90,000 dollars to Hambali as a reward for this first Bali, to do the other Marriott attack. Well, when did we arrest Hambali? When did KSM get arrested? When the Marriott –

Q: Hambali was arrested afterwards...

A: Absolutely afterwards.

Q: But Zubair, one of his main lieutenants was arrested before.

A: Let's talk about KSM. KSM was arrested, Hambali was later arrested, and the Marriott plot took place. Now, this enhanced interrogation techniques, didn't talk about the 100,000 dollars to do another operation that he gave to Hambali. Hambali talked about it, KSM didn't talk about it. KSM was arrested before Hambali, you put them together, figure it out.

Q: It didn't work.

A: And Hambali did not go through waterboarding. So the guy who did not go through waterboarding talked about the 100,000 dollars. The guy who went through waterboarding didn't say anything about anything. The technique works? This is just, I'm trying to put some critical thinking into just the facts, does it make sense? I don't know, for me it doesn't.

Q: I think you've been most generous with your time, and fascinating... Well, you certainly got them on your side...

A: From day one, I've been still saying the same things again and again and again, they are the ones who keep changing their stories with every declassified document...
